The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 18
Issue 1 Spring 2016

Article 1

3-2016

Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Small Business Lending
Travis R. Davidson
Ohio University - Main Campus

W. Gary Simpson
Oklahoma State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the
Other Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Davidson, Travis R. and Simpson, W. Gary (2016) "Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Small Business
Lending," The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, pp. 1-21.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1255
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol18/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 18, NO. 1 (SPRING 2016) 1-21

Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Small
Business Lending
Travis R. Davidson
Ohio University
W. Gary Simpson
Oklahoma State University

ABSTRACT
Adequate credit availability for small businesses is an important public policy issue because small businesses
are essential for employment and economic growth for the economy. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 includes a provision that could potentially support financial institutions in the provision of credit to
small businesses through the use of advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system that are
secured with small business loans. We explore the relation between FHLB advances to financial institutions
and the provision of loans to small businesses. We find a positive link between the change in FHLB
advances and the change in small business loans and the level of FHLB advances and the level of small
business loans. This relation holds for large and small banks and pre- and post-2007 recession. However,
we find that the change in the proportion of small business loans to assets is only positively related to the
change in the advances to assets ratio prior to the recessionary period. This suggests that banks substitute
small business loans for other types of assets during relatively normal economic periods, but FHLB
advances are a source of wholesale funds that will be invested in the most attractive financial assets available
with no preference for any particular asset during periods of contracting credit.
Keywords: Federal Home Loan Bank, Advances, Small Business Lending, Small Business Credit
JEL Codes: G21, G28

I.

Introduction

The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, included a provision that permitted community financial
institutions to borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and use small

Copyright © 2016 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial
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business and small agricultural loans as collateral 1 (Craig and Thomson 2003). Prior to
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, only mortgage loans and, to some extent, other real estate
loans were eligible as collateral for FHLB advances (Craig and Thomson 2003).
Historically, FHLB advances were intended to provide funding for housing (Flannery
and Frame 2006). Congressional motivation for this tweak of policy is not clear but one
reasonable interpretation is that congress intended to provide support for increased
lending to small businesses and small farms.
Regardless of the legislation’s intent, it is clear from the FHLB website that
community lending is now important to the system (www.fhlbanks.com). After more
than a decade and a significant recession, the importance of small businesses as creators
of jobs remains an important policy consideration 2. The creators of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act did not foresee all of the events of the first decade of the 21st century but the
decision to provide funding for small businesses through the FHLB system, a
government-sponsored enterprise, is probably more relevant today than ever. The FHLB
system is a large financial entity with total assets over one trillion dollars at its peak in
2008 (Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Banks 2008) and a significant
capacity to provide funding to financial institutions for small business loans. An
important policy issue and the focus of this investigation is the nature of the relation
between FHLB system advances to financial institutions and the credit extended to small
businesses by financial institutions. In other words, do commercial banks use funds
borrowed from the FHLB system to make loans to small businesses?
The FHLB system is composed of 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks. All
regional FHLBs sponsor some form of Community Investment Cash Advance (CICA)
program. Table 1 displays these and other similar programs. Although the names and
specific terms vary by regional FHLB, all CICA programs are meant to provide member
institutions with reduced cost advances for the purpose of increasing certain types of

Nearly all commercial banks are permitted to join and subsequently borrow from the FHLB. Only
community financial institutions, defined to have assets under $500 million in 1999 dollars, are able to
use small business loans as collateral for advances. See Stojanovic et al. (2008) for a more detailed
discussion.
1

2

Berger and Udell (1998) provide a description of the relationship of small businesses to the economy and
the importance of small businesses. They also describe the process and some of the problems associated
with financing small businesses.
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community lending. At each regional FHLB, small business loans qualify as community
lending, meaning members can make use of these programs to obtain lower cost advances
if the funds are used for small business loans. Many regional FHLBs have additional
programs that promote small business lending. For example, the Dallas and Pittsburg
FHLBs administer programs that provide grant funding to small businesses that have
borrowed from FHLB member institutions (called the Economic Development Program
Plus and the Banking on Business program respectively). The Topeka FHLB operates
the Joint Opportunity for Building Success program that provides grant funding to
member institutions for the purpose of community job creation. All of these programs,
if successful, should decrease the cost of and increase the amount of funding available to
small business.
Figure 1. Aggregate Small Business Lending
The sum of all small business loans outstanding is graphed for each year. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel
of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level Reports of Condition and Income from 2001
to 2014. Dollar amounts on the horizontal axis are in billions of dollars.
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Our research is unique and adds to the evolving literature on the FHLB system
in the following ways. First, we are the only investigation that uses a large panel of data
to investigate the link between FHLB advances and small business loans provided by
commercial and savings banks. Only one other study by Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville
(2005) investigates this relation and they use cross-sectional data for 2003. Second, our
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Table 1. Regional Federal Home Loan Bank Small Business Lending Programs
Each of the individual regional Federal Home Loan Banks is permitted to develop their own programs to promote
community lending. Below is a list of programs that are partially or solely used to promote small business loans.
Regional FHLB
Atlanta
Boston

Chicago
Cincinnati
Dallas

Des Moines

Indianapolis
New York

Pittsburgh

San Francisco
Seattle
Topeka

Program Name
Economic Development
Plan
Community Development
Advance
Community Investment
Cash Advance
Community Investment
Cash Advance
Economic Development
Program
Economic Development
Program Plus (EDPPlus)
Community Investment
Cash Advance
Community Lending
Advance
Community Investment
Program
Community Lending
Program for Small Business
Lending
Rural Development
Advance
Urban Development
Advance
Community Lending
Program
Banking on Business (BOB)

Advances for Community
Enterprise
Economic Development
Fund
Community Development
Program
Joint Opportunity for
Building Success

Details of Program
Advances are priced 10 basis points below normal advance rates to provide
funding for projects and business in moderate income communities.
Provides discounted funding for small business or personal lending for
borrowers in locations at or below 115% (100%) of area median income
for rural (urban) areas.
Provides discounted lending for a variety of loans, including small
business loans.
Provides discounted advances for low income housing or economic
development, including small business loans.
Provides favorably prices advances to fund economic development.
Provides grants of up to $25,000 to qualifying small businesses that have
borrowed from FHLB member institutions.
Provides funding to members at cost to fund projects, including small
business loans.
Provides low cost funding for commercial and agricultural lending.
Provides favorably-priced funds for community economic development in
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.
Provides less expensive advances for small business lending.

Provides low priced advances for individuals with less than 115% of area
median income in areas with a population less than 25,000.
Provides low priced advances for individuals with less than 100% of area
median income in areas with a population greater than 25,000.
Provides advances 20 – 40 basis points below normal advances rates for
community and economic development.
Provides recoverable grants for startup funding to small businesses that
must be combined with small business loans. BOB funding recovery is
made based on the health of the small business and has the following
repayment terms: 0% interest and no principal repayment in year 1, 3%
interest (retained by the member) and principal repayment begin in year
2, and 6% interest (with 3% retained by the member and 3% by the
FHLB) in year 3 forward.
Provides low priced advances for the purpose of community lending.
Provides reduced rate advances to support economic development.
Provides low cost funding for community development.
Provides grants to promote economic initiatives that promote community
employment growth.
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data set is recent and covers the time period 2001-2014. This allows us to examine the
effect of advances during the financial crisis in which small business lending was reduced,
as documented by Cole (2012) and shown in Figure 1. The reduced lending that resulted
from the 2007 recession made support for small business lending imperative. If advances
from the FHLB are indeed being used by banks for small business loans, it is particularly
important that this relation holds during times of reduced liquidity and contracting
credit. We find that FHLB advances are being used to fund small business loans by both
large and small banks and both pre- and post-2007 recession, but banks only shift their
asset portfolios to more heavily favor small business loans before the 2007 recession.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes previous research that is
relevant to the present investigation and Section III presents the hypotheses tested.
Section IV explains the sample, data, and statistical method. Section V presents the
results of the statistical tests of the hypotheses, and the last section develops the
implications of the results.
II.

Literature Review

Very few empirical investigations have explored the effects of FHLB advances on
commercial bank performance. This is somewhat surprising given the size, scope, and
potential influence of the FHLB system. Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) refer to the
FHLB system as “a large, complex, and understudied U. S. Government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE) that was created in the midst of the Great Depression.” The FHLB
system consists of twelve cooperatively owned “banks” which provide secured loans called
advances to over 8,000 member institutions, including commercial banks, thrifts, credit
unions, and insurance companies (Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame 2009). The ability to inject
approximately one trillion dollars in funding into the banking system offers the
possibility for a major impact on the economy.
Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) investigate the relationship between changes
in FHLB advances at the institution level and changes in other balance sheet changes
during the second half of 2007. For a period of six quarters before 2007 that they
considered normal, they find there is a strong correlation between changes in FHLB
advances and changes in both mortgage loans and non-mortgage loans for small
institutions but a much weaker relationship for large institutions (Ashcraft, Bech, and
Frame 2009). Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) find that small banks and thrifts
probably use FHLB advances to smooth out changes in funding during the normal
period while larger institutions are less dependent on FHLB advances to meet funding
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needs. However, in the third quarter of 2007 many of the relationships changed. Larger
institutions began to use FHLB advances more. The correlation between FHLB
advances and mortgage loans for small institutions increased some during the third
quarter of 2007, but the relation for large institutions increased significantly. The
positive correlation between changes in FHLB advances and changes in non-mortgage
loans became larger in the third quarter of 2007 for small institutions but became much
weaker to the point of turning negative for larger institutions. The aforementioned
relationships in the Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) investigation returned to the precrisis baseline in the fourth quarter of 2007. Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) conclude
that FHLB advances are used to smooth one time liquidity imbalances but the
willingness of institutions to lend, not funding pressure, normally is the binding
constraint on the origination of new loans.
Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) find that FHLB advances are just as likely
to be used for non-mortgage loans as mortgage loans for single-family housing. They
also find that FHLB advances are used to meet unexpected credit requests due to changes
in loan demand but mortgages are not unique in this respect (Frame, Hancock, and
Passmore 2007). Furthermore, Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) conclude that
FHLB advances are probably not stabilizing financing for housing, and financial
institutions appear to be using FHLB advances as a wholesale funding source to fund all
types of commercial bank assets, not just mortgages. Frame, Hancock, and Passmore
(2007) refer to the idea that FHLB advances are just part of a pool of funds that are not
linked to any particular type of assets as the “wholesale funding view” of FHLB advance
usage. According to this view, we would not expect to see FHLB advances tied to a
particular type of loan such as small business loans.
Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005) find that single-family mortgage loans and
multifamily mortgage loans are positively correlated with the amount of FHLB advances.
However, they do not find a positive correlation between FHLB advances and other
loans, which includes agricultural loans, small business loans, construction loans, and
land development loans, unless the size of the financial institution is considered. Their
results indicate a positive relationship between FHLB advances and other loans for
institutions with assets less than $1 billion but no relationship for larger institutions
(Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville 2005). Institution size does not affect the relationship
between FHLB advances and either single-family mortgage loans or multifamily
mortgage loans (Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville 2005). Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005)
conclude that FHLB advances translate into more credit for housing, small businesses,
and agriculture in the economy and the communities served by financial institutions.
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Craig and Thomson (2003) explore the relationship between bank deposits and
small business loans with a panel of data from 1993 through 1999. Their analysis
addresses the existence of funding constraints in small loan markets prior to the GrammLeach-Bliley Act that were hypothesized to be the source of a market failure causing the
need for the subsidy of FHLB advances. Craig and Thomson (2003) find that
community banks in rural areas have more funds available than they can loan to their
relationship borrowers, which argues against a funding constraint. Furthermore, Craig
and Thomson (2003) find that increases in the demand for small business loans and
agricultural loans are easily met by the community banks shifting more liquid assets into
these types of loans. They conclude that the extension of FHLB advances secured with
small business and small farm loans is unlikely to increase the amount of loans to small
businesses and small farms.
The relationship of primary interest for this analysis is the link between FHLB
advances and loans to small businesses. Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) report some
evidence of a positive link between FHLB advances and small business loans that is
strongly influenced by the size of the financial institution and general economic
conditions. However, Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2009) ultimately conclude that the
willingness of institutions to lend is the binding constraint on new loans, not lack of
funding. Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) conclude that financial institutions
view FHLB advances as fungible and simply include advances in a general pool of funds
that is not directed to any one type of asset. This view suggests that FHLB advances do
not necessarily produce increased loans to small businesses. Craig and Thomson (2003)
come to a similar conclusion because they find no evidence of a funding constraint on
financial institutions and banks seem to simply liquidate more liquid assets when loan
demand increases. Tuccillo, Flick, and Ranville (2005) provide evidence of a link
between FHLB advances and small business loans. They conclude that FHLB advances
increase loans to small businesses for small financial institutions with assets less than one
billion dollars but there is no evidence of a link for larger financial institutions.
III.

Hypotheses

Craig and Thomson (2003) argue that small businesses rely heavily on small
community banks to provide the financing for their operations. They base their
argument on the work of Peterson and Ranjan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) that
suggests the importance of relationship lending by small community banks for small
business financing. Craig and Thomson (2003) further argue that if community banks
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are constrained for funds in their local markets, then the availability of additional funding
through FHLB advances will result in increased funding for small businesses because
small business loans can be used as the required collateral for FHLB advances. However,
if financial institutions are not funding constrained, Craig and Thomson (2003) argue
that it is not certain if financial institutions will direct advances into loans to small
businesses or not. Financial institutions may simply view FHLB advances as another
source of funding and direct the funds to the best available asset that may not be a small
business loan. Based on their evidence that community banks are not funding
constrained, Craig and Thomson (2003) conclude that there is no reason to believe that
FHLB advances will be used specifically to generate small business loans.
However, Craig and Thomson (2003) argue that since small business loans may
be used as collateral towards advances, community financial institutions may increase
their issuance of these types of loans even if they are not funding constrained. The reason
for a bank to specifically direct advances towards these asset types is to increase the types
of assets that may be used as collateral against new advances. Stojanovic et al. (2008)
describe issuing qualified loans to permit increased access to advances as maintaining an
option on advances. A bank wishing to grow could use advances to make mortgage loans,
small business loans, or agricultural production loans and then secure additional advances
by posting the newly made loans as collateral. In this case, advances would alter the
portfolio make-up of banks by changing the amount of mortgage or community lending.
Assuming that neither bank asset size nor asset composition is fixed, Craig and Thomson
(2003) contend that the collateralization option is likely to induce community financial
institutions to increase their holdings of all types of assets, with an increasing share of
total assets invested in small business loans.
Given the FHLB’s focus on community economic development and the
associated reduced-cost advances, we posit that this line of reasoning suggested by Craig
and Thomson (2003) is the correct description of reality. We predict that the ability of
financial institutions to use small business loans as collateral for FHLB advances will
cause financial institutions to increase the volume of small business loans, an asset growth
effect in the terminology of Craig and Thomson (2003), and the proportion of small
business loans in an institution’s portfolio of assets, a portfolio substitution effect in the
terminology of Craig and Thomson (2003). Our hypotheses in the alternative form are:
Asset Growth Hypothesis (H1a): The volume of FHLB advances is
positively related to the volume of small business loans for a financial
institution.
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Portfolio Substitution Hypothesis (H2a): The proportion of FHLB advances
to total assets is positively related to the proportion of small business loans
to total assets for a financial institution.
IV.
A.

Implications
Data and Sample

Data from bank level Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) available
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from 2001 to 2010 and from FFIEC Central
Data Repository's Public Data Distribution site from 2011 to 2014 is employed in the
statistical analysis. The sample is composed of yearly data from 2001 to 2014 because
FHLB advances were not recorded on Call Reports until 2001, and small business loans
are only available once per year in the June 30 Call Report until 2010. All sample banks
have a minimum of $1 million in assets, $500,000 in core deposits, and $750,000 in
loans. These restrictions are imposed to remove data reporting errors and banks that are
no longer able to operate. Adding these restrictions reduces the number of bank-year
observations from 107,924 to 106,062.
Table 2 contains summary statistics. The number of banks in the sample
decreases from 8,595 in 2001 to 6,598 in 2014. Panel A displays statistics for the entire
sample. Construction of all variables is detailed in Table A1. Banks have $75 million
small business loans outstanding and have $43 million in advances from the FHLB on
average. We follow Cole (2012) and define small business loans as the sum of
commercial and industrial loans (C&I) and commercial real estate loans (CRE) with
original amounts less than $1 million unless substantially all of C&I and CRE have
original amounts less than $100,000. In this case, we define small business loans to be
the sum of C&I and CRE. Average bank size is $1.43 billion while $424 million of
assets are liquid. Liquid assets are composed of the sum of cash and balances due from
depository institutions, Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to
resell, securities held until maturity, and securities available for sale. Assets are funded
with an average of $149 million in equity and $246 million in core deposits which are
the sum of deposits from transaction accounts and time deposits less than $100,000.
Non-performing loans and leases (sum of loans and leases 90 days past due, nonaccrual
loans and leases, and other real estate owned) average almost $15 million compared to
$265 million in outstanding mortgage loans, business loan commitments of $287
million, and total credit of $2.3 billion. Mortgage loans are the sum of all loans backed

0
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by residential property and total credit is the sum of total assets and total commitments.
Average bank net income in the sample is $6.8 million. We winsorize the percent change
in small business loans and the percent change in FHLB advances at -1 and +1.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014. All dollar amounts are in thousands. SBL is small business
loans. FHLB is Federal Home Loan Bank advances. TA is total assets. Equity is total equity capital. NPL is nonperforming loans and leases. B Commitments is business commitments and T Commitments is total commitments. TC
is total credit. Mortgages is mortgage loans. The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1. PC(∙) is the
percentage change from year t-1 to year t. Δ(∙) is the change from year t-1 to year t. Ln(∙) is the natural logarithm.
Panels B and C contain mean values, standard errors, and the test statistic of the difference in means for large vs. small
banks and banks with above vs. below average FHLB advances to total assets respectively. Small Banks are defined to
have less than or equal to $1 billion in total assets. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**),
and 0.10 (*) levels.
Variable
Mean
Dollar Amounts
SBL
75,391
43,460
FHLB
1,428,825
TA
Equity
149,208
NPL
14,764
Net Income
6,810
Liquid Assets
423,941
Core Deposits
246,239
B Commitments
287,466
T Commitments
854,420
TC
2,283,237
265,338
Mortgages
Variables of Primary Interest
PC(SBL)
0.0479
-0.0011
Δ(SBL/TA)
Ln(SBL)
9.7238
PC(FHLB)
-0.1050
0.0002
Δ(FHLB/TA)
Ln(FHLB)
9.0656
Control Variables
SBL/TA
0.1559
FHLB/TA
0.0372
Equity/TA
0.1107
NPL/TA
0.0140
Net Income/TA
0.0040
Liquid Assets/TA
0.3212
Core Deposits/TA
0.4434
B Commitments/TC
0.0723
Mortgages/TA
0.1963

Panel A: Full Sample
Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

583,306
667,970
27,100,000
2,644,789
502,605
132,579
8,820,556
3,159,663
6,400,287
18,900,000
41,300,000
5,214,978

0
0
2,298
-161,976
0
-3,238,426
0
520
0
0
2,298
0

36,700,000
87,700,000
2,000,000,000
183,000,000
65,500,000
10,200,000
788,000,000
237,000,000
660,000,000
1,510,000,000
2,880,000,000
386,000,000

0.2555
0.0468
1.6916
0.4288
0.0273
1.7370

-1
-0.6307
0
-1
-0.4286
0

1
0.7633
17.4188
1
0.4200
18.2896

0.1051
0.0539
0.0500
0.0236
0.0074
0.1609
0.1421
0.0549
0.1344

0
0
-0.1175
0
-0.3858
0
0.00004
0
0

0.9784
0.6413
0.9580
0.4889
0.2340
0.9911
0.9294
0.9638
0.9776
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Variable

Mean

Dollar Amounts
SBL
675,516
FHLB
497,295
TA
17,500,000
Equity
1,830,808
NPL
169,515
Net Income
84,825
Liquid Assets
5,198,387
Core Deposits
2,487,628
B Commitments
3,781,950
T Commitments
11,400,000
TC
28,900,000
Mortgages
3,212,588
Variables of Primary Interest
PC(SBL)
11.2682
-0.0047
Δ(SBL/TA)
Ln(SBL)
12.3269
PC(FHLB)
4.1346
-0.0013
Δ(FHLB/TA)
Ln(FHLB)
11.7300
Control Variables
SBL/TA
0.0988
FHLB/TA
0.0565
Equity/TA
0.1076
NPL/TA
0.0152
0.0046
Net Income/TA
Liquid Assets/TA
0.2827
Core Deposits/TA
0.2413
B Commitments/TC
0.1053
Mortgages/TA
0.2017

11

Panel B: Large vs. Small Banks
Large
S.E.
Mean

Small
S.E.

Difference

24,162
28,181
1,141,023
111,197
21,519
5,586
372,498
132,294
270,272
797,211
1,735,277
221,343

29,496
8,522
183,028
18,968
2,850
768
54,161
72,644
16,855
35,485
218,512
38,449

110
62
600
68
25
7
204
212
97
3821
3888
173

646,020***
488,772***
17,300,000***
1,811,840***
166,664***
84,057***
5,144,226***
2,414,984***
3,765,096***
11,400,000***
28,700,000***
3,174,139***

10.6111
0.0003
0.0174
1.0023
0.0004
0.0239

0.3906
-0.0008
9.5268
0.8439
0.0003
8.7719

0.0351
0.0002
0.0049
0.2416
0.0001
0.0062

10.8776
-0.0039***
2.8001***
3.2906***
-0.0016***
2.9581***

0.0008
0.0008
0.0006
0.0003
0.0001
0.0018
0.0014
0.0008
0.0016

0.1602
0.0357
0.1109
0.0139
0.0039
0.3242
0.4591
0.0698
0.1959

0.0003
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.00002
0.0005
0.0004
0.0002
0.0004

-0.0615***
0.0208***
-0.0033***
0.0013***
0.0007***
-0.0415***
-0.2178***
0.0356***
0.0058***

The average percent change in small business loans is nearly 5%, the average change in
the small business loans to total assets ratio is -0.0011, and the natural logarithm of small
business loans averages 9.7. The percent change in FHLB advances averages -0.105, the
average change in the advances to total assets ratio is 0.0002, and the natural logarithm
of advances averages 9. Not shown in Table 2, the sample includes 6,484 bank-year
observations of De Novo banks defined to have been in operation for less than five years.
Table 2 Panel B displays summary statistics for large vs. small banks. Large banks
are defined to have greater than $1 billion in total assets. The large bank sample has a
larger natural logarithm of small business loans, but has a smaller change in the small
business loans to total assets ratio, and there is no difference between the average percent

2
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Panel C: Banks with Above vs. Below Average Advances to Assets
Below Average
Above Average
S.E.
Mean
S.E.
Difference

Mean
Dollar Amounts
SBL
85,091
FHLB
95,507
TA
1,046,266
Equity
109,421
NPL
11,045
Net Income
4,252
Liquid Assets
254,970
Core Deposits
226,466
B Commitments
173,774
T Commitments
337,303
TC
1,383,559
Mortgages
256,489
Variables of Primary Interest
PC(SBL)
0.2735
-0.0020
Δ(SBL/TA)
Ln(SBL)
10.2165
1.0417
PC(FHLB)
0.0070
Δ(FHLB/TA)
Ln(FHLB)
9.7613
Control Variables
SBL/TA
0.1643
FHLB/TA
0.0942
Equity/TA
0.0997
NPL/TA
0.0152
Net Income/TA
0.0039
Liquid Assets/TA
0.2663
Core Deposits/TA
0.4052
B Commitments/TC
0.0774
Mortgages/TA
0.2308

1,993
4,634
64,222
6,047
483
270
16,423
6,525
18,738
48,532
101,340
12,929

70,087
15,051
1,638,134
170,976
16,793
8,210
516,390
257,057
349,669
1,137,344
2,775,478
270,168

2,551
1,906
123,762
12,120
2,372
612
40,924
14,579
28,622
85,876
188,221
23,737

15,004***
80,456***
-591,869***
-61,555***
-5,748**
-3,958***
-16,423***
-30,592*
-175,895***
- 800,041***
-1,391,919***
- 13,679

0.0344
0.0002
0.0075
0.2206
0.0002
0.0073

1.6919
-0.0006
9.4518
1.3850
-0.0036
7.9261

1.2052
0.0002
0.0067
0.4949
0.0001
0.0106

-1.4184
-0.0015***
0.7647***
-0.3432
0.0106***
1.8352***

0.0005
0.0003
0.0002
0.0001
0.00003
0.0007
0.0007
0.0003
0.0007

0.1512
0.0061
0.1167
0.0133
0.0040
0.3513
0.4644
0.0695
0.1775

0.0004
0.00004
0.0002
0.0001
0.00003
0.0006
0.0006
0.0002
0.0005

0.0131***
0.0881***
-0.0170***
0.0019***
-0.00002
-0.0850***
-0.0592***
0.0078***
0.0532***

change in small business loans for large vs. small banks. The large bank sample has a
larger average natural logarithm of FHLB advances and a larger average percent change
of advances. The average change in the advances to asset ratio is negative for the large
bank sample, but positive for the small bank sample implying large banks are becoming
less reliant on advances as a source of funding while small banks are becoming more
reliant on advances during the sample period.
Summary statistics for banks with above vs. below average FHLB advances to
total assets are display in Panel C of Table 2. Banks that fund a higher percent of assets
with advances lend more to small businesses (SBL and Ln(SBL)) and small business loans
compose a larger percent of assets at these banks which preliminarily suggests a positive
relation between advances and small business loans. However, the sample of banks with
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above average advances to assets has a more negative change in small business loans to
assets ratio and there is no difference between the percent change in small business loans
between banks with above and below average advances to assets, on average.
B.

Statistical Method

We investigate the effect of FHLB advances on small business lending with a
series of regressions that contain year and bank fixed-effects and standard errors clustered
at the bank level that take the following form:

SBLi, t =β0 +β1 FHLBi, t + ∑ βk Controlk, i, t-1 + ∑ βt 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + ∑ βi 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + εi, t

(1)

where SBL is one of three measures of small business loans following Cole (2012). The
first measure is the percent change in the dollar value of small business loans (PC(SBL))
at bank i from year t-1 to year t as measured by Berger and Udell (2004). The second
measure is the change in the ratio of small business loans to total assets (Δ(SBL/TA)) at
bank i from year t-1 to year t as measured by Peek and Rosengren (1998). The final
measure is the natural logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) at bank i in year t.
The independent variable of primary interest is FHLB advances which is
measured in the same manner as small business loans in each regression (PC(FHLB),
Δ(FHLB/TA), and Ln(FHLB)). Other independent variables include a vector of control
variables (control) and time (year) and bank (bank) fixed-effects. All control variables
are lagged one year relative to SBL. We follow Cole (2012) and control for capital
adequacy with total equity (Equity/TA), asset quality with nonperforming loans and
leases (NPL/TA), earnings with net income (Net Income/TA), and liquidity with liquid
assets (Liquid Assets/TA), each scaled by total assets. Also following Cole (2012), we
include the core deposits to total assets ratio (Core Deposits/TA), the ratio of business
loan commitments to total credit (B Commitments/TC), bank size measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank
has been in operation for less than five years (De Novo). Finally, we include the ratio of
mortgage loans to total assets (Mortgages/TA). FHLB advances have traditionally been
given to financial institutions to promote mortgage lending so it is important to control
for the amount of mortgage lending to prevent a spurious correlation in the regressions.
We use the percentage change in small business loans (PC(SBL)) and the natural
logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) to investigate the relation between the
amount of advances outstanding and the amount of small business loans to addresses
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whether banks are using FHLB advances to increase small business lending (Asset
Growth Hypothesis). The change in the small business loans to assets ratio
((Δ(SBL/TA)) is used to examine whether banks are changing the proportion of these
assets in their asset portfolio (Portfolio Substitution Hypothesis). In all specifications, a
positive coefficient on the FHLB advances variable is interpreted as support for the
respective hypothesis.
V.

Results

The results of estimating Eq. (1) are presented in Table 3. Column (1) shows
that the percentage change in FHLB advances is positively related to the percentage
change in small business lending. This supports the asset growth hypothesis that the
ability of financial institutions to use small business loans as collateral for FHLB advances
causes an increase in small business loans. The percentage change in small business
lending is positively related to net income, business commitments to total credit, and the
indicator variable for De Novo banks and is negatively related to the proportion of assets
composed of small business loans, nonperforming loans, liquid assets, and bank size.
Column (2) displays the results of using the change in the small business loans
to assets ratio. Contrary to the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis, the change in the
proportion of assets funded with FHLB advances is not related to the change in the
proportion of small business loans in the asset portfolio. We do not find evidence that
banks are using advances to increase small business lending relative to other assets. The
change in the proportion of assets composed of small business loans is positively related
to the business commitments to total credit ratio and the indicator for De Novo banks
and is negatively related to the small business loans to assets ratio, nonperforming loans,
net income, liquid assets, bank size, and mortgage loans.
Table 3 Column (3) shows that the natural logarithm of small business loans is
positively related to the natural logarithm of FHLB advances which supports the asset
growth hypothesis. Banks that borrow more from the FHLB, lend more to small
businesses. We also find that the natural logarithm of small business loans is positively
related to the small business loans to assets ratio, equity capital, the business
commitments to total credit ratio, bank size, and the De Novo indicator variable and is
negatively related to nonperforming loans, net income, liquid assets, and mortgage loans.
We split the sample by size and re-estimate Eq. (1) because previous work by Craig and
Thomson (2003), Peterson and Ranjan (1994), and Berger and Udell (1995) suggests
the relation between advances and small business lending should be stronger for small
banks and because of the documented difference in the operations of small and large
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Table 3. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014. All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq.
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level. The dependent variable is the percent change in small business
loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of
small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. The primary independent variable of interest
is the percent change in FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)),
and the natural logarithm of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. All control variables are
lagged one year. Control variables scaled by total assets include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and
leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and
mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA). Other control variables include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit
(B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has
been in operation for less than five years (De Novo). The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.
Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy variables are not displayed to conserve space. P-values
are displayed in brackets below the coefficients. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and
0.10 (*) levels. An F-Test confirms the overall validity of the model at better than the 1% level in each specification.
Explanatory Variables

PC(FHLB)
Δ(FHLB/TA)

(1)
PC(SBL)
0.0386***
[<0.001]

Ln(FHLB)
SBL/TA
Equity/TA
NPL/TA

Net Income/TA
Liquid Assets/TA
Core Deposits/TA
B Commitments/TC
Ln(TA)
Mortgages/TA
De Novo

-1.6950***
[<0.001]
-0.0469
[0.636]
-1.6827***
[<0.001]
1.0719***
[0.002]
-0.1263***
[<0.001]
-0.0169
[0.397]
0.3427***
[<0.001]
-0.1650***
[<0.001]
-0.0081
[0.849]
0.0843***
[<0.001]

Dependent Variable
(2)
Δ(SBL/TA)
0.0055
[0.382]

-0.4811***
[<0.001]
-0.0138
[0.102]
-0.1449***
[<0.001]
-0.2495***
[<0.001]
-0.0185***
[<0.001]
-0.0018
[0.565]
0.0133*
[0.065]
-0.0142***
[<0.001]
-0.0247***
[<0.001]
0.0095***
[<0.001]

(3)
Ln(SBL)

0.0290***
[<0.001]
3.1159***
[<0.001]
0.4307***
[<0.001]
-2.4338***
[<0.001]
-2.0212***
[0.004]
-0.4754***
[<0.001]
0.0226
[0.516]
0.4419***
[<0.001]
0.6434***
[<0.001]
-0.1830**
[0.049]
0.0234*
[0.055]
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banks (Berger et al., 2005). Large banks are defined to have greater than $1 billion in
total assets, and small banks have less than or equal to $1 billion in assets. Table 4 shows
that the relation between FHLB advances and small business lending is qualitatively the
same for both large and small institutions. The positive relation between advances and
small business loans in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) support the asset growth hypothesis.
The change in the proportion of advances to assets is not significantly related to the
change in the proportion of small business loans to assets in columns (2) and (5). We
find no evidence for the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis for large or small banks.
The financial crisis that began in 2007 created a liquidity shock that negatively
affected the supply of credit. Figure 1 displays aggregate small business lending by year.
Small business lending steadily increased prior to the crisis and then declined sharply
after the onset before leveling off in the final years of our sample. The contraction in
lending to small businesses during the recession made funding for these loans even more
critical. We therefore split the sample into two time periods, 2001-2007 and 20082014, and re-estimate Eq. (1) to examine the effects of FHLB advances on small business
lending pre- and post-recession. Columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) of Table 5 show support
for the asset growth hypothesis in both time periods because advances are positively
related to the amount of small business lending.
However, evidence of the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis differs by time
period. As shown in column (2), prior to the recession there is a positive relation (pvalue of 0.08) between the change in the proportion of advances to assets and small
business loans to assets suggesting that as banks funded more assets with advances they
increased small business lending more than other types of assets. We find no such
support for the portfolio substitution effect hypothesis after the onset of the recession.
Column (5) of Table 5 shows an insignificant relation between the change in the
advances to assets ratio and the change in the small business loans to assets ratio during
2008-2014. Combined with the results in Columns (4) and (5), this suggests that after
the beginning of the recession banks still used advances to fund small business loans, but
they did not show a preference to fund small business loans proportionately more than
other types of assets.
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Table 4. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending for Large and Small Banks
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014. All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq.
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Large banks are defined to have greater than $1 billion in total
assets. The dependent variable is the percent change in small business loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business
loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1) and
(4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively. The primary independent variable of interest is the percent change in
FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)), and the natural logarithm
of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively. All control variables are
lagged one year. Control variables scaled by total assets include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and
leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and
mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA). Other control variables include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit
(B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has
been in operation for less than five years (De Novo). The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1.
Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy variables are not displayed to conserve space. P-values
are displayed in brackets below the coefficients. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and
0.10 (*) levels. An F-Test confirms the overall validity of the model at better than the 1% level in each specification.
Explanatory
Variables

PC(FHLB)
Δ(FHLB/TA)

(1)
PC(SBL)
0.0451***
[<0.001]

Ln(FHLB)
SBL/TA
Equity/TA
NPL/TA

Net Income/TA
Liquid Assets/TA
Core Deposits/TA
B
Commitments/TC
Ln(TA)
Mortgages/TA
De Novo

-2.2937***
[<0.001]
-0.1540
[0.565]
-1.7252***
[<0.001]
1.3066*
[0.075]
-0.1579*
[0.065]
-0.0070
[0.924]
0.3431*
[0.063]
-0.1505***
[<0.001]
0.0620
[0.654]
0.0578
[0.340]

Large Banks
(2)
Δ(SBL/TA)
-0.0162
[0.137]

-0.5506***
[<0.001]
0.0707
[0.168]
0.0663
[0.238]
0.0535
[0.504]
-0.0254**
[0.017]
-0.0117
[0.467]
-0.0251**
[0.033]
-0.0016
[0.542]
-0.0009
[0.937]
-0.0080
[0.188]

Dependent Variable
(3)
Ln(SBL)

0.0398***
[0.002]
4.3683***
[<0.001]
-0.8503
[0.364]
-1.8448***
[0.002]
0.4789
[0.783]
-0.6428**
[0.032]
-0.1000
[0.601]
-0.4075
[0.348]
0.5316***
[<0.001]
0.1768
[0.700]
-0.0054
[0.964]

(4)
PC(SBL)
0.0372***
[<0.001]

-1.7030***
[<0.001]
-0.1388
[0.210]
-1.7186***
[<0.001]
1.0751***
[0.006]
-0.1297***
[<0.001]
-0.0208
[0.325]
0.3597***
[<0.001]
-0.1930***
[<0.001]
-0.0395
[0.400]
0.0762***
[<0.001]

Small Banks
(5)
Δ(SBL/TA)
0.0075
[0.275]

-0.4857***
[<0.001]
-0.0232**
[0.011]
-0.1574***
[<0.001]
-0.2793***
[<0.001]
-0.0198***
[<0.001]
-0.0031
[0.327]
0.0172**
[0.034]
-0.0157***
[<0.001]
-0.0288***
[<0.001]
0.0094***
[<0.001]

(6)
Ln(SBL)

0.0248***
[<0.001]
3.0383***
[<0.001]
0.5272***
[<0.001]
-2.5535***
[<0.001]
-2.3585***
[0.001]
-.4724***
[<0.001]
0.0487
[0.148]
0.5074***
[<0.001]
0.6570***
[<0.001]
-0.2441***
[0.003]
0.0272**
[0.024]
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Table 5. FHLB Advances and Small Business Lending Pre- and Post- 2007 Recession
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 106,062 firm year observations taken from the June 30th bank level
Reports of Condition and Income from 2001 to 2014. All estimates are obtained from fixed-effects regressions of Eq.
(1) with standard errors clustered at the bank level. The dependent variable is the percent change in small business
loans (PCSBL), the change in the small business loans to total assets ratio (Δ(SBL/TA)), and the natural logarithm of
small business loans (Ln(SBL)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) respectively. The primary
independent variable of interest is the percent change in FHLB advances (PC(FHLB)), the change in the advances to
total assets ratio (Δ(FHLB/TA)), and the natural logarithm of advances (Ln(FHLB)) in columns (1) and (4), (2) and
(5), and (3) and (6) respectively. All control variables are lagged one year. Control variables scaled by total assets
include: total equity (Equity/TA), nonperforming loans and leases (NPL/TA), net income (Net Income/TA), liquid
assets (Liquid Assets/TA), core deposits (Core Deposits/TA), and mortgage loans (Mortgages/TA). Other control variables
include: the ratio of business loan commitments to total credit (B Commitments/TC), the natural logarithm of total
assets (Ln(TA)), and a dummy variable equal to one if a bank has been in operation for less than five years (De Novo).
The construction of all variables is defined in Table A1. Coefficients for the constant term and year and bank dummy
variables are not displayed to conserve space. P-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficients. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. An F-Test confirms the overall validity of
the model at better than the 1% level in each specification.
Explanatory
Variables

PC(FHLB)
Δ(FHLB/TA)

(1)
PC(SBL)
0.0380***
[<0.001]

Ln(FHLB)
SBL/TA
Equity/TA
NPL/TA

Net Income/TA
Liquid Assets/TA
Core Deposits/TA
B
Commitments/TC
Ln(TA)
Mortgages/TA
De Novo

-2.5330***
[<0.001]
-.2986
[0.103]
-2.4342***
[<0.001]
-1.1591
[0.249]
-0.0869
[0.111]
0.0010
[0.981]
0.2160**
[0.023]
-0.3108***
[<0.001]
-0.0239
[0.747]
0.0624***
[<0.001]

2001-2007
(2)
Δ(SBL/TA)
0.0158*
[0.080]

-0.6866***
[<0.001]
-0.0355**
[0.023]
-0.1856***
[<0.001]
-0.2979***
[0.004]
-0.0163**
[0.016]
0.0038
[0.513]
-0.0096
[0.469]
-0.0278***
[<0.001]
-0.0233**
[0.017]
0.0161***
[<0.001]

Dependent Variable
(3
Ln(SBL)

0.0367***
[<0.001]
1.7650***
[<0.001]
-0.0289
[0.891]
-1.9707***
[<0.001]
-3.1348*
[0.074]
-0.4638***
[<0.001]
0.1367***
[0.007]
0.2764**
[0.030]
0.4265***
[<0.001]
-0.3673***
[0.003]
0.0108
[0.552]

(4)
PC(SBL)
0.0342***
[<0.001]

-2.6356***
[<0.001]
0.3940***
[0.008]
-1.0302***
[<0.001]
1.2262***
[0.001]
-0.2308***
[<0.001]
-0.0663**
[0.038]
0.4168***
[<0.001]
-0.1844***
[<0.001]
-0.2033***
[0.001]
0.0188
[0.144]

2008-2014
(5)
Δ(SBL/TA)
0.0108
[0.167]

-0.6612***
[<0.001]
-0.0151
[0.167]
-0.0434***
[0.003]
-0.1122**
[0.014]
-0.0357***
[<0.001]
-0.0140***
[0.001]
0.0292***
[0.004]
-0.0048***
[0.006]
-0.0552***
[<0.001]
0.0001
[0.972]

(6)
Ln(SBL)

0.0245***
[<0.001]
1.8146***
[<0.001]
0.4437***
[0.004]
-1.5768***
[<0.001]
-0.5042
[0.413]
-0.6977***
[<0.001]
-0.0685
[0.116]
0.3012
[0.189]
0.6148***
[<0.001]
-0.5335***
[<0.001]
-0.0460***
[0.003]
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Conclusion

Adequate credit for small businesses is an important public policy issue because
small businesses are important sources of employment and economic growth for the
economy (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007). It is generally
recognized that depository financial institutions are important providers of credit to
small businesses and several federal programs exist to support financial institutions in
their role as lenders to small businesses (for example, the Small Business Administration).
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 includes a somewhat obscure provision that could
potentially support commercial banks in the provision of credit to small businesses
through the use of advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank system secured by small
business loans. The exact intent of this legislation is not clear, but the dramatic increase
in the size and importance of the FHLB system offers the possibility that FHLB advances
to depository institutions might be an important source of credit for small businesses.
Furthermore, given the recent state of the U. S. economy, the need to provide financing
to small businesses seems an even larger public policy issue. The original intent of FHLB
advances was to support housing finance but the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act provided the
pathway for FHLB financing of small businesses through the banking system. Our
analysis explores the relation between FHLB advances to financial institutions and the
provision of loans to small businesses.
We find evidence of a positive link between the change in FHLB advances and
the change in small business loans and the amount of FHLB advances and the amount
of small business loans. This relation holds for large and small banks and pre- and post2007 recession. We interpret our results to support the asset growth hypothesis of Craig
and Thomson (2003).
We also investigate the possibility that the higher the proportion of FHLB
advances in the total funding of a financial institution, the higher the proportion of small
business loans in the institution’s asset portfolio. In other words, do financial institutions
rearrange their asset portfolios to include more loans to small businesses as a result of
using a greater proportion of FHLB advances? In most specifications, we find no
evidence for this portfolio substitution effect, consistent with the proposition of Frame,
Hancock, and Passmore (2007) that FHLB advances are one of many sources of
wholesale funds available to financial institutions, and they will be invested in the most
attractive financial assets available with no preference for any particular asset. However,
when we split the sample by time we find a positive relation between the change in the
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advances to assets ratio and the change in the small business loans to assets ratio in the
years 2001-2007.
We know that FHLB advances to depository financial institutions have increased
in recent time periods. However, it was not clear if this funding was being directed
towards the new mission of funding small businesses. We conclude that funding from
advances is being used to support small business lending. Our evidence suggests that if
the FHLB wishes to increase its support of small business lending, focusing on providing
funds to banks during periods of contracting credit is especially important.
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